Legislature(2015 - 2016)CAPITOL 120
02/01/2016 01:00 PM House JUDICIARY
| Audio | Topic |
|---|---|
| Start | |
| HB221 | |
| HB147 | |
| Adjourn |
* first hearing in first committee of referral
+ teleconferenced
= bill was previously heard/scheduled
+ teleconferenced
= bill was previously heard/scheduled
| + | HB 147 | TELECONFERENCED | |
| + | TELECONFERENCED | ||
| += | HB 221 | TELECONFERENCED | |
HB 147-ANIMALS: PROTECTION/RELEASE/CUSTODY
1:10:33 PM
CHAIR LEDOUX announced that the final order of business would be
HOUSE BILL NO. 147, "An Act relating to the investigation of
cruelty to animals complaints; relating to the seizure of
animals; relating to the destruction of animals; relating to a
bond or security posted for the costs of care for an animal;
relating to the inclusion of an animal in a protective order and
the crimes and arrests for violating that protective order; and
relating to the ownership of an animal upon divorce or
dissolution of marriage."
1:10:54 PM
REPRESENTATIVE LYNN moved to adopt CSHB 147, labeled 29-
LS0302\D, Wallace, 1/27/16 as the working document.
CHAIR LEDOUX objected.
1:11:28 PM
CHAIR LEDOUX informed the committee she was using the electronic
witness system for first time.
1:11:57 PM
REPRESENTATIVE GRUENBERG presented HB 147, Version D, as co-
sponsor and noted that many co-sponsors are attached to the
bill. He said that Representative Liz Vazquez and he were
prepared to discuss the differences between [Version Y] and
Version D, together with the major issues. He advised the title
has been changed "in some cases" to conform to the new
amendments.
REPRESENTATIVE GRUENBERG referred to Section 1 and advised it is
a new section that provides that a peace officer may apply for a
search warrant, etcetera. He pointed to the change, replacing
the word "take" with the word "seize" throughout the first part
of the bill, and advised that if the government "takes"
something that is illegal, or in this case not being cared for,
it is technically a "seizure."
CHAIR LEDOUX asked Representative Gruenberg to explain the
difference between taking something and seizing something.
REPRESENTATIVE GRUENBERG replied that seizure is usually
performed by the government, and he opined that seizure is the
current and more accurate term.
1:14:55 PM
NICOLI BAILEY, Staff, Representative Max Gruenberg, Alaska State
Legislature, explained that within this part of the animal
cruelty bill, it is usually the government that will seize the
animals if neglected or treated cruelly.
1:15:21 PM
REPRESENTATIVE CLAMAN opined there has been much litigation over
"takings" in recent years, he asked whether the seizure concept
suggests some temporary nature to the "taking" in that "taking"
appears more permanent.
REPRESENTATIVE GRUENBERG answered yes, because generally, as in
Title 3, the animal is seized with a right to a hearing. He
said there are provisions within the first section of the bill
to modernize the provisions so that the seizing entity, or
custodian humane society, can recompense the cost of care. He
explained that there are three parts to the bill: the first part
modernizes Title 3, the seizure of animals and cost of care; the
second deals with domestic violence statutes; and the third
deals with family law and a few other things.
1:16:36 PM
REPRESENTATIVE GRUENBERG referred to page 2, and said the
definition is removed because all of the definitions are located
at the end of the animal seizure section of Title 3. He then
referred to Sec. 3, page 2 and advised that those definitions
are found later in the bill.
CHAIR LEDOUX referred to AS 03.55.120 "Seizure of the animals"
and pointed to "seize" in place of "removing." She asked
whether Representative Gruenberg actually wants to have removing
here because seizing offers the impression that it is
contraband, or the like, being seized where, actually, the goal
is to remove the animals from a dangerous situation.
REPRESENTATIVE GRUENBERG noted that Chair LeDoux made a good
point and said he had asked the bill drafter to conform the
bill, and opined that it conforms. He referred to page 2, lines
20-25, which read:
Sec. 03.55.120. Seizure of animals. (a) A peace
officer shall place an animal in protective custody
before seizing [REMOVING] the animal from the location
where it was found. If the animal is seized
[REMOVED], the peace officer shall place the animal
with a veterinarian licensed under AS 08.98 or, if a
veterinarian is not readily available, with a
responsible public or private custodian to be
sheltered, care for, and provided necessary medical
attention.
1:18:43 PM
REPRESENTATIVE GRUENBERG referred to page 3, lines 1-3, which
read:
(1) the animal shall be considered a stray
or abandoned; and
(2) the notice required in (b) of this
section shall be conspicuously posted at the premises
from which the animal was seized.
REPRESENTATIVE GRUENBERG said that was included to give an owner
as much notice as possible. He then referred to page 3, lines
23-24, which read:
(d) ... An owner or custodian may prevent
the animal's adoption or destruction by
REPRESENTATIVE GRUENBERG explained that an owner or custodian
will have standing to petition the court in that the owner may
have left the animal in a custodian's care and the custodian
would want to file a petition.
REPRESENTATIVE GRUENBERG said they modernized this entire part
of the law by deleting the language from page 3, line 27, and
inserting it into a new section, Sec. 7 of the bill. In the
event an owner contests the seizure of the animal, upon a motion
the court will be able to enter an order for the actual cost of
care of the animal, he explained. [Seizure] can involve
numerous animals and a long period of time for care which, he
pointed out, is a financial problem for municipalities and
shelters around the state.
1:20:56 PM
CHAIR LEDOUX noted that he had deleted the posting of the bond
requirement.
REPRESENTATIVE GRUENBERG explained that the requirement moved to
Sec. 7 of the bill. He said that the order may include a
requirement that the owner post a bond or other security to
cover the cost of care [page 4, lines 5-8]. He paraphrased page
4, lines 8-9, as follows: "If, without justifiable cause, the
owner fails to comply with the order, the court may order that
the animal be forfeited." He noted the animal could then be put
up for adoption or other actions.
REPRESENTATIVE GRUENBERG referred to Sec. 8, [AS 03.55.130(f)]
page 4, lines 11-15, which read:
(f) The state may not be required to
reimburse a public or private agency, organization, or
person that voluntarily assist with the seizure [A
REMOVAL] of an animal or receives custody of an animal
seized [REMOVED] under this section for the cost of
care [COSTS OF SHELTER, CARE, VETERINARY ASSISTANCE,
OR MEDICAL TREATMENT RENDERED TO] the animal.
REPRESENTATIVE GRUENBERG pointed to line 14, and explained that
rather than define costs of care there, the definitions are in
Sec. 10 of the bill.
1:22:12 PM
REPRESENTATIVE KELLER said, does it not require the use of a
veterinarian and questioned whether page 4, line 10 ...
REPRESENTATIVE GRUENBERG interrupted and said that the
provisions involving veterinarians are unchanged and do not
appear in the bill.
REPRESENTATIVE KELLER continued asking his question and said
that the state may not be required to reimburse, and yet the
bill also requires the use of a veterinarian.
REPRESENTATIVE GRUENBERG agreed and said that the state is not
required to reimburse - that is in existing law and unchanged.
REPRESENTATIVE KELLER requested of Chair LeDoux that no action
be taken on HB 147 today, thereby allowing time to [review
Version D].
CHAIR LEDOUX advised that she intends to hold HB 147.
1:23:26 PM
REPRESENTATIVE LIZ VAZQUEZ, Alaska State Legislature, restated
Representative Keller's question and asked whether his concern
was regarding the present law as stated in Sec. 8, AS
03.55.130(f), page 4, line 11, "the state may not be required to
reimburse a public or private agency." She quiered whether that
was his concern, and noted that it is in present law.
REPRESENTATIVE KELLER responded that he had not thought it
through that well, and advised that he saw the inconsistency in
Sec. 2, [AS 03.55.110(c), page 2, [lines 3-6], regarding the
requirement of a veterinarian, and he then read that there
cannot be reimbursements. He said he saw the inconsistency,
raised it, and hadn't gone any further than that.
1:24:30 PM
REPRESENTATIVE GRUENBERG referred to [Sec. 9, AS 03.55.130(g),
page 4, lines 17-18], which read:
(g) Nothing in (d) or (e) of this section shall
shift the burden of proof from the party who would
otherwise have that burden.
REPRESENTATIVE GRUENBERG offered that the government seizing the
animal has the burden of proof, as in any other similar case.
He pointed out that the sponsors wanted it clear that nothing
would be construed to the contrary.
REPRESENTATIVE KELLER referred to [Sec. 2, AS 03.55.110(c), page
2, lines 13-18], and asked the significance of deleting the
definition of peace officer and reinserting it on page 4, lines
27-31.
REPRESENTATIVE KELLER asked Megan Wallace, Legislative Legal
Counsel, to explain the ramifications and significance of the
deletion of the definition of "peace officer" on page 2, lines
13-18, and the implications of the reinsertion on page 4, lines
27-31.
1:27:15 PM
MEGAN WALLACE, Attorney, Legislative Legal Counsel, Legislative
Legal and Research Services, Legislative Affairs Services,
responded that the term "peace officer" is currently only
defined in the bill in AS 03.55.110(c), and the term is also
used in AS 03.55.120 and 03.55.130. She said in moving the
definition from AS 03.55.110 to the definitions in AS 03.55.190,
the same definition for "peace officer" will apply to all three
sections. She summarized that definition is clarified to apply
to sections AS 03.55.110 - 03.55.130 as opposed to just AS
03.55.110.
REPRESENTATIVE GRUENBERG moved to Sec. 11, [AS 11.56.740(a)] and
described it as a grammatical clean-up of language in criminal
law that deals with violating a protective order. He referred
to a 12/24/15 memorandum from Megan Wallace to Representative
Max Gruenberg which stated there is a possibility that the
inclusion of this section may violate the single subject rule
because it does not deal directly with animals. He advised that
the sponsors discussed this issue and the possibility of
excising this and inserting it in a different bill. He
explained his desire to retain the provision in HB 147 because
it is not uncommon for a legislator to receive a memorandum
advising that a certain bill [drafting] violates the single
subject rule. He further explained that it is seldom the Alaska
Supreme Court actually uses that and holds that something is
unconstitutional. In this particular case, he argued, it would
be very unlikely that it would be raised in that it is simply a
stylistic change. Also, he opined, it does not violate the
single subject rule, and referred the committee to the 1/21/16
memorandum directed to "Other Legislators" from Representatives
Vazquez and Gruenberg contained with committee packets.
REPRESENTATIVE VAZQUEZ interjected that the memorandum was
signed by Representatives Vazquez and Gruenberg expressing their
opinions. She pointed out that they are both attorneys, and
members of the Alaska Bar Association.
1:31:09 PM
REPRESENTATIVE GRUENBERG offered that it is the sponsors'
opinion this did not add another subject, but rather cleans up
some language, and he characterized it as a technical change.
The remedy, he further offered, if something does violate the
single subject rule is ... under Title 1, he paraphrased, a
statute says that "every bill, unless it says otherwise, shall
be held to contain a severability clause which says that so much
of it as ... does violate the single subject rule, or whatever,
is just taken out of the bill." He surmised that the only
remedy would be that this provision would be deleted and the
current language would remain in. He offered the sponsors'
belief that despite the possibility of violating the single
subject rule [contained within Ms. Wallace's memorandum] and in
using this as an example, it is important to establish some
precedent. He offered his intention to state on the floor that
this would not be a violation [of the single subject rule] or
would change the bill. He noted he would like to see the
committee not shy away as in some cases it would require passing
a whole new bill.
CHAIR LEDOUX questioned whether this issue has anything to do
with the bill that the committee heard last year, or is this
trying to make the law in general a better thing.
REPRESENTATIVE GRUENBERG responded that he was not exactly sure
when it was put in, but the intent is to help make the law
better in dealing with this body of law. He opined that the
issue was at least to have some precedent in this area, and that
it can be removed.
CHAIR LEDOUX commented that most people don't Christmas tree
their own bills, but if that is his desire.
REPRESENTATIVE GRUENBERG characterized it as "winterizing."
1:33:44 PM
REPRESENTATIVE KELLER expressed that the discussion does open up
the possibility, with that section of law open, that something
can happen in a later committee that may not be noticed. He
described it as significant and stressed that he likes the
single subject law, and wants to keep it as tight as possible.
He indicated his discomfort in intentionally violating it.
REPRESENTATIVE GRUENBERG answered that he would be the last
person someone would accuse of letting something slide by, and
at some point a committee member may want this as a precedent.
He reiterated that it can be removed.
1:34:42 PM
REPRESENTATIVE MILLETT said she has bills she would like to
receive Representatives Gruenberg and Vazquez' legal opinion.
She pointed out that she "haven't seen a bill come through when
legal opinions from the attorneys within our body as legal
opinions from the legislature." She described it as a very
unique situation.
REPRESENTATIVE GRUENBERG reminded the committee that a few years
ago the governor tried to do "something with the budget that was
very strange," with an attorney general's opinion on the
subject. He noted that he had prepared a memorandum and
ultimately the governor removed the "something strange."
1:35:45 PM
REPRESENTATIVE KELLER referred to the issue of paying
veterinarians and noted that when a bill is open it is a good
time to clean up the act.
He offered the scenario of his dog barking, the neighbor calls
the police, and the police come and orders a veterinarian. He
asked whether he pays under the existing law, which would mean
that a neighbor can incur a debt for the owner. He suggested
fixing that section of law while it is open.
REPRESENTATIVE GRUENBERG responded "I won't comment on that
until I know what you're talking about."
1:36:28 PM
REPRESENTATIVE GRUENBERG referred to Sec. 12, [AS
11.61.140(a)(2), page 5, lines 19-21], which read:
(2) has a legal duty to care for the animal
and, with criminal negligence fails to care for an
animal and, as a result, causes the death of the
animal or causes severe physical pain or prolonged
suffering to the animal;
REPRESENTATIVE GRUENBERG advised that AS 11.61.140(a)(2) deals
with criminal negligence and whether it could apply to just
anyone. For example, a person notices their neighbor's dog is
starving and doesn't do anything about it, the question is
whether the person will be criminalized. He advised that a
recent court of appeals decided that the legislature had not
defined who was subject to the law as it was not in the statute.
The court of appeals took the common law approach and decided
that it would only apply to a person with a legal duty to care
for the animal - either owning the animal or someone entrusted
with the animal's care. He opined, this case involved someone
in the Matanuska-Susitna area with a number of horses
"terrifically neglected," and the sponsors believe it should be
included within the statute itself and, thereby did not require
researching a court of appeals opinion.
1:38:16 PM
REPRESENTATIVE KELLER questioned whether determining who has the
legal duty is something new in that it isn't defined, except
possibly by case law.
REPRESENTATIVE GRUENBERG commented that there is a body of case
law "that does this, it's not a new concept." He reiterated
that it includes an owner or someone entrusted with the care of
the animal.
REPRESENTATIVE KELLER pointed out that if it is not in there
now, by putting this in there will that cause more determination
on who has the legal duty.
REPRESENTATIVE GRUENBERG replied that it doesn't seem to, in
that it seems to have been the first case ... no other case has
been cited in Alaska that has determined this, although it does
cite a number of cases from other jurisdictions. He said, "This
is clearly the majority view." He characterized the
legislature's work on statutes as cryptic, and said the statute
is then interpreted and fleshed out by judges in the common law.
1:39:58 PM
CHAIR LEDOUX surmised that this section basically codifies the
common law.
REPRESENTATIVE GRUENBERG agreed, and cited Sickel v. State of
Alaska, 363 P3d 115 (2015).
CHAIR LEDOUX asked whether that was the subject of the case.
REPRESENTATIVE GRUENBERG answered "Yes it was."
CHAIR LEDOUX questioned whether someone was prosecuted for
failing ... when they had no legal ...
REPRESENTATIVE GRUENBERG explained that a person owned many
horses and had entrusted the horses to another person. That
person was prosecuted, who alleged that "I am not within the
ambit of subsection (2) because I didn't own the horse ... the
horses." The court said no, that the person was entrusted with
the horses, and; therefore, had a legal duty not to neglect
them. He expressed that the situation was so bad the horses
were frozen to the ground, and one horse was not saved. He
remarked that the proper person was prosecuted, appealed on that
point, lost, and the conviction was affirmed.
1:41:52 PM
CHAIR LEDOUX referred to the section "has a legal duty to care
for the animal" and said she was unsure what it does exactly.
REPRESENTATIVE GRUENBERG offered that it makes clear to anyone
reading the statute, such as an Alaska State Trooper in the bush
or a judge, that the law remains the same. He explained it
gives public notice of an important holding, and it is not
necessary to perform legal research "to get there."
1:42:34 PM
REPRESENTATIVE KELLER restated that a lot of court action is
invited to determine and define the legal duty in caring for an
animal. He said there is nothing in the bill that references
the case to make that definition, and questioned whether there
should be a definition in statute.
1:43:05 PM
The committee took an at-ease from 1:43 p.m. to 1:45 p.m.
1:45:53 PM
CHAIR LEDOUX asked the sponsors to present their bill and take
questions at the end of the presentation.
REPRESENTATIVE GRUENBERG referred to Sec. 13, [AS 18.65.520(a),
page 6, beginning line 5] and said it involves domestic
violence, and various shelters expressed concern. Considerable
negotiation ensued, he said, and there is an email stating that
they now support what has been done. He explained that Sec. 13
is in Title 18, and it defines "essential personal items to
include pets, regardless of the ownership of the items." In
that regard, he said, they are not adjudicating who will own the
animal, but who will have the animal during the period of the
domestic violence order, which includes pets in the person's
care.
REPRESENTATIVE GRUENBERG referred to [Sec. 13, AS
18.65.520(a)(12), page 7, lines 28-31] which read:
(12) require your abuser to pay support for
you, [OR] a minor child in your care, or a pet in your
care if there is an independent legal obligation of
your abuser to support you, [OR] the child, or the
pet;
REPRESENTATIVE GRUENBERG explained that the provision allows the
court to enter an order for the animal's support and, for
example, if the animal is being abused the order can include
veterinarian bills. He offered that the sponsors taught a class
at the University of Alaska, Anchorage Justice Center, and
Assistant Professor Kristin Knudsen asked students to suggest
amendments. He noted a student's suggestion that if the court
is allowed to award an order for possession of the animal, the
order should include support of the animal.
1:49:30 PM
REPRESENTATIVE GRUENBERG referred to Sec. 14, [AS 18.65.590,
page 8, lines 22-25], which read:
(2) "pet" means a vertebrate living creature
maintained for companionship or pleasure, but does not
include dogs primarily owned for participation in a
generally accepted mushing or pulling contest or
practice or animals primarily owned for participation
in rodeos or stock contests.
REPRESENTATIVE GRUENBERG explained that the "domestic violence
folks" asked that the term "pet" be used in these provision for
domestic violence as opposed to "any animal" because the current
police and court forms are limited to pets.
1:50:00 PM
REPRESENTATIVE GRUENBERG referred to [Sec. 15, AS 18.66.100(c),
page 8, beginning line 26], and said they tracked AS 18.66,
which involves stalking as a form of domestic violence, and the
same language appears throughout Sec. 15. He pointed out that
provision AS 18.66 is defined the same way in Sec. 17.
REPRESENTATIVE GRUENBERG referred to Sec. 16, [AS
18.66.990(3)(I), page 10, lines 30-31], which read:
(I) cruelty to animals under AS
11.61.140(a)(5)if the animal is a pet;
REPRESENTATIVE GRUENBERG explained that the added provision was
suggested by [Anchorage attorney] Allen Bailey who is a
nationally recognized authority on domestic violence. He
referred AS 18.66.990(3), which read:
(3) "domestic violence" and "crime involving
domestic violence" mean one or more of the following
offenses or an offense under a law or ordinance of
another jurisdiction having elements similar to these
offenses, or an attempt to commit the offense, by a
household member against another household member:
REPRESENTATIVE GRUENBERG said that Mr. Bailey pointed out that
AS 18.66.990(3) which defines the crimes, one of which must be
proven in order to be eligible to receive a domestic violence
order, did not include cruelty to animals under AS
11.61.140(a)(5). He said AS 11.61.140(5) discusses torturing or
killing an animal to terrorize someone else which is direct
domestic violence. The provision is to protect the human and
animal victims, he related.
1:51:47 PM
REPRESENTATIVE GRUENBERG referred to Sec. 18, [AS
22.15.030(a)(11), page 12, lines 3-4], which read:
(11) over cases involving cruelty to or
seizure, destruction, adoption, or cost of care of
animals under AS 03.55.100 - 03.55.190.
REPRESENTATIVE GRUENBERG pointed out that the district court is
a court of limited jurisdiction, and that the current VAWA does
not have jurisdiction over cases under AS 03.55.100-.190, which
was dealt with at the beginning of the bill. He explained that
no superior court is readily available in areas of Alaska where
this occurs. Therefore, he pointed out, the sponsors added that
a provision that district courts would be allowed to hear these
cases. Over the last 20-30 years, Alaska has consistently
expanded the jurisdiction of the district court and that this
appears appropriate, he said.
REPRESENTATIVE GRUENBERG related that Sec. 19 and the following
sections amend the divorce and dissolution statutes to allow a
court to enter an order. He referred to [Sec. 19, AS
25.24.160(a)(I)(5), page 14, lines 5-6], which read:
(5) if an animal is owned, for the
ownership or joint ownership of the animal, taking
into consideration the well-being of the animal.
REPRESENTATIVE GRUENBERG explained that an order can be entered
for the ownership of the animal or joint ownership, taking into
consideration the animal's well-being. Traditionally, he noted,
this is not a time consuming process and courts are getting into
this because many Alaskans have pets that are considered members
of the family, but it is a property. He said there is an Alaska
case discussing a type of seisin property - a live non-human
being, unlike ownership of a car.
1:53:58 PM
REPRESENTATIVE GRUENBERG advised that the continuing sections,
generally use the same language, and track it throughout the
divorce and dissolution statutes. He referred to Sec. 26, [AS
25.24.990, page 17, lines 20-21], which read:
Section 25.24.990. Definition. In this
chapter, "animal" means a vertebrate living creature
not a human being.
REPRESENTATIVE GRUENBERG explained that it allows any animal
with a vertebrate to be the subject of such an order.
1:54:40 PM
The committee took an at-ease from 1:54 p.m. to 1:56 p.m.
1:56:33 PM
REPRESENTATIVE GRUENBERG called the committee's attention to a
1/31/16 letter contained within the committee packet, directed
to Representative Max Gruenberg from Professor David Favre,
J.D., Professor of Law, Michigan State University, College of
Law, East Lansing, Michigan, who complimented HB 147.
Representative Gruenberg characterized Professor Favre's
comments as a "pretty good piece of work."
1:56:53 PM
CHAIR LEDOUX asked the committee whether there were any
questions specifically regarding HB 147, Version D. There were
no questions.
CHAIR LEDOUX removed her objection, and pointed out that she
will speak with the sponsors before the bill again comes before
the committee.
CHAIR LEDOUX opened public testimony.
1:57:44 PM
RONNIE ROSENBERG, Commissioner, Fairbanks Northstar Borough
Commission; Fairbanks Animal Shelter Fund, advised she was
testifying as a 20-year commissioner on the Fairbanks Northstar
Borough Commission, and as a founding member and president of
the Fairbanks Animal Shelter Fund which is the support group for
the Fairbanks Northstar Borough Animal Shelter. She offered
that over the years they have spent many thousands of dollars on
seized animals due to neglect and domestic violence cases. She
said they very much support the ability to be reimbursed for
monies expended for veterinary care and supplies for abused and
neglected animals. Moreover, she pointed out, in the last six
months the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) considers
animal abuse to be a high priority and; therefore, animal abuse
is moving to a federal focus. She said her organizations may
see more animals coming in as a result of this, and that it is
necessary to receive reimbursement at the time of seizure and to
allow a judge to order that the defendant reimburse. She opined
that having been a lawyer and having worked with domestic
violence victims in North Dakota and Minnesota it is apparent
that perpetrators will hold the animal as a pawn either to keep
or terrorize the person. Although, she pointed out, when that
can't be done they will inflict injury on the animal as a
control mechanism, which is not an exception. She asserted that
it is unfortunate Alaska law does not include non-vertebrates in
its animal protection statutes as many people are attached to
their reptiles and fish. She offered a case wherein someone was
flushed fish down the toilet as a mechanism to control the
victim. She supports this bill and hopes it passes with bi-
partisan action, she stated.
2:01:35 PM
TRACEY WOLLENBERG, Deputy Director, Appellate Division, Central
Office, Public Defender Agency (PDA), Department of
Administration (DOA), referred to Sec. 16, [AS 18.66.990(3)(I)],
page 10, lines 30-31, which read:
(I) cruelty to animals under AS
11.61.140(a)(5) if the animal is a pet;
MS. WOLLENBERG pointed out that cruelty to animals under AS
11.61.140(a)(5) provides that a person commits that offense if,
with some exceptions, the person knowingly kills or injures an
animal with the intent to intimidate, threaten, or terrorize
another person. Her concern, she stated, is that including this
provision wholesale into the definition of crime involving
domestic violence, even limited to situations where the animal
is a pet, is overly broad and goes beyond the common
understanding of domestic violence. Essentially, she explained,
as currently written the persons referred to in AS
11.61.140(a)(5), which is the relevant cruelty to animal's
provision, need not be household members as that term is defined
in AS 18.66.990. She offered a scenario that if a person
knowingly injures another's pet, for example on the Coastal
Trail in Anchorage, with the intent to intimidate, threaten, or
terrorize that other person, that offense would constitute
cruelty to animals under AS 11.61.140(a)(5), but it would also
be characterized as a domestic violence offense under this
proposal even though the two people had never met before the
confrontation. Essentially, she explained, the proposal in Sec.
16 scoops into the definition of domestic violence persons who
commit a certain type of animal cruelty in an effort to harass
or threaten others even if the people involved have no pre-
existing domestic relationship. She opined that the intent of
the provision; however, was primarily to prevent a person from
harming a pet with the intent to intimidate, threaten, or
terrorize another person with whom there is a pre-existing
domestic relationship. That intent can be clarified not only by
limiting animals as pets but also by limiting the persons who
are the target of the intimidation or threatening to household
members. She added that household member is also defined under
the existing statute AS 18.66.990(5). She further opined that
in order to effectuate what she assumed is the intent of the
committee, the provision could define domestic violence or crime
involving domestic violence of including cruelty to animals
under AS 11.61.140(a)(5), not only if the animal is a pet, but
also if the person who is the subject of intimidation,
threatening, or terrorizing, is a household member under
subsection (5).
2:05:48 PM
REPRESENTATIVE GRUENBERG indicated that the sponsors will work
with Ms. Wollenberg as their intent is to limit it to the people
subject to domestic violence orders.
2:07:01 PM
LAUREE MORTON, Executive Director, State Council on Domestic
Violence and Sexual Assault, paraphrased her written testimony
as follows:
Thank you for hearing the bill today. My remarks go
toward the protective order provisions of the bill.
People who choose to commit acts of domestic violence
use whatever they perceive as effective means of
control to coerce the people they victimize. All too
often pet abuse is one of those means. They may
refuse to allow the pet to be taken to the vet for
care, they may threaten to harm or kill the pet, they
may actually harm or kill the pet, they may target
pets of family or friends, they may blame the
disappearance of the family pet on a victim to create
a wedge between her or him and the children, they may
file theft charges if the victim leaves with pets or
may enter into custody battles over pets. Bonds
between pets and their owners are very strong.
Sometimes victims are hurt trying to protect their
pets. Sometimes they wait to leave because they don't
have anywhere to go with their pets. Sometimes they
return because of the fear of what will happen to
their pets.
In a national study, over 71 percent of women who
sought shelter ... were concerned with leaving their
pets at home, or whether or not they would have a
place to safely take them. Animal abuse also
functions as an indicator of high lethality. Research
has found that batterers who abuse pets are more
dangerous than those who don't. In fact, pet abusing
batterers employ more controlling behaviors, more
sexual assault, marital rape, emotional violence, and
stalking. Other studies have revealed that a history
of threatened or actual pet abuse is one of the four
most significant risk factors for becoming a domestic
violence abuser. It is important to offer protections
for pets to increase safety tools for victims to use
as they attempt to flee the violence perpetrated
against them. In Alaska, victims who choose to file
petitions for protective orders may include pets in
the order now. There is a general provision to allow
any other kind of order ... the relief the court deems
necessary in order to further that protection. This
bill; however, adds the specific language of pets and
I think helps victims and petitioners understand that
that's a readily available remedy to them. In
addition, there are shelters in Alaska. We fund 18
... of those programs. Many of them are able to offer
places for pets to stay on the premises, if they're
not, they help the petitioner or victim who needs that
service to find other places ... safe places, maybe
with veterinarians. One regional shelter has worked
with Safe Homes so that the pet can go into a home of
a person who would foster the pet, for example. So we
appreciate the opportunity to have pets included in
the language for protection orders and think it will
make it a stronger protection for victims as they
escape violence.
2:10:33 PM
MS. MORTON referred to [Sec. 16], page 10, line 19, and opined
that the previous speaker may have misunderstood the list of
crimes involving domestic violence. She referred to page 10,
line 19, and said the offense must be committed by "a household
member against another household member." She further opined
that if the previous speaker's comments were correct in that
sense, then none of these crimes would work right.
2:11:39 PM
MS. WOLLENBERG apologized to the committee and said it was an
oversight on her part. Her only concern, she related, is that
there are two potential victims under the AS 11.61.140(a)(5)
crime. She said that the animal is the subject, "knowingly
kills or injures an animal." The intent provision is to
intimidate, threaten, or terrorize another person. She remarked
that she would want the legislative history, if that were the
intent, language to be clear that the person referred to in the
animal cruelty provision is really the household members
discussed and not the pet.
REPRESENTATIVE GRUENBERG acknowledged, it was not a fair
question on his part. He then asked "the two of you" to get
together with his staff to determine the language and bring it
back to the committee.
2:13:21 PM
REPRESENTATIVE LYNN offered a scenario of a person having a pet
and asked "is it joint property ... the one who acquires the cat
or dog and brings it home." In the event a pet is being abused
for the purpose of intimidating the other member, can either
person take the cat or dog to a safe place without permission of
the other, he asked. He said that at the proper time he would
appreciate clarification.
2:14:22 PM
REPRESENTATIVE GRUENBERG asked that a law professor from the
Council for the Humane Society in New York possibly be allowed
to testify at some point.
2:15:28 PM
CHAIR LEDOUX closed public testimony after ascertaining that no
further wished to testify. She added that if there is someone
in particular the sponsors would like to invite to testify, it
is something that can be discussed.
[CSHB 147 was held over.]
| Document Name | Date/Time | Subjects |
|---|---|---|
| HB 147 - CS Version D.pdf |
HJUD 2/1/2016 1:00:00 PM |
HB 147 |
| HB 147 - CS Version D - Sponsor Statement.pdf |
HJUD 2/1/2016 1:00:00 PM |
HB 147 |
| HB 147 - CS Version D - Sectional Summary.pdf |
HJUD 2/1/2016 1:00:00 PM |
HB 147 |
| HB 147 - Legal Memo RE Single Subject.pdf |
HJUD 2/1/2016 1:00:00 PM |
HB 147 |
| HB 147 - Response to Legal Memo RE Single Subject.pdf |
HJUD 2/1/2016 1:00:00 PM |
HB 147 |
| HB 147 - Fact Sheet from Humane Society.pdf |
HJUD 2/1/2016 1:00:00 PM |
HB 147 |
| HB 147 - Support Letter - ANDVSA.pdf |
HJUD 2/1/2016 1:00:00 PM |
HB 147 |
| HB 147 - Support Letter - Prof David Favre.pdf |
HJUD 2/1/2016 1:00:00 PM |
HB 147 |